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Introduction 
Relations between India and the European Union (EU hereafter) are generally considered as 
not being meaningful and of little importance. The low level of bilateral trade, the barely 
noticeable cooperation within the “strategic partnership”1 between the EU and India, and the 
long lasting negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) between the EU and India are some 
of the contributing factors to this situation (Wouters et al. 2013: 2; Singh 2016: 539ff.; 
Wülbers & Betz 2014: 1ff.; Felbermayr et al. 2016: 10ff.; Khorana 2019). 
This situation of underexplored bilateral relations between the EU and India is also 
accompanied by a negative perception that one side has of the other (Jain & Pandey 2019: 
98f.; Sachdeva 2015: 40; Pandey 2019: 90). Moreover, this situation reveals that the EU and 
India have not yet found a common language on many points. Obviously, there is no lack of 
topics of conversation between the two sides, but a lack of understanding.       
It is generally known that understanding and thoughts are expressed through 
language(s), and that language(s) and thought(s) depend on what is perceived. What is 
perceived, in turn, depends on what kind of language(s) is/are spoken.       
Statements and analyses in the context of EU-India relations are primarily based on 
English language. However, as will be shown below, the focus on English language is 
accompanied by misunderstandings and problems. In this context, it should also be borne in 
mind that many languages are spoken in India and the EU. Hindi is one of the Indian 
languages that has long been more important in India than English in many ways. Also, for 
this reason, this essay will include aspects of the perception of India’s Hindi-speaking civil 
society regarding the EU-India “strategic partnership”.  
The first part of this essay discusses the “strategic partnership” between the EU and 
India. Focus will be on the role of military cooperation within this partnership, on an 
imprecise definition of this partnership and on trade-related aspects. These explanations are 
followed by explanations of the importance of language and perception in the context of the 
“strategic partnership” between the EU and India. A closer look at the role of the Hindi 
language will also be part of these. Subsequently a number of specific presentations on 
India’s perception of the EU, the EU-India FTA and military cooperation within the EU-India 
“strategic partnership” will be presented. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn.  
 
The “strategic partnership” between the EU and India  
 
For the EU, the “strategic partnership” with India is one of ten that EU concluded worldwide. 
In contrast, India has already entered into 31 “strategic partnerships” between 1997 and 2017 
(Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 310f.; Jain 2014: 7f.; Singh 2016: 542f.; Sachdeva 2016: 11; Park 
2019: 258; Cihelková et al. 2020: 1723).  
The European Commission (EC) already signalled its interest in a stronger partnership 
with India in 1996 by publishing a document entitled EU-India Enhanced Partnership. At the 
 
1 Please refer to the following section “Imprecise definition of ‘strategic partnership’”. 
 
first EU-India Summit in 2000 both sides agreed on a “new strategic partnership” based on 
shared values and objectives (Jain 2014: 6; Singh 2016: 541). This summit is considered as 
the beginning of a process of the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. A joint 
declaration has been issued to set out the framework of this partnership (Jain 2014: 6; Singh 
2016: 541; Jaffrelot 2006: 2f). In 2004, the EC issued a further communication in which it 
proposed an ambitious “strategic partnership” with India, given India’s major international 
position, economic prosperity, vast territory and large population (Stamelos & Tsimaras 2019: 
137; Wouters et al. 2013: 2; Singh 2016: 542; Jaffrelot 2006: 2f.). The agenda for the 
“strategic partnership” was set at the EU-India summit in 2005 and supplemented in 2006 by 
a joint action plan, which in turn developed into further joint action plans (Wülbers 2011: 19; 
Wülbers & Betz 2014: 2; Jain 2014: 7).   
In November 2018, the EC published the Communiqué Elements for an EU Strategy 
on India. According to this communiqué, cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, 
climate change, defence and security is to be expanded (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 321). The EC 
expressed its willingness to intensify military cooperation with India in a question and answer 
document (EC 2018). This readiness is also reflected in the document EU-India Strategic 
Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025, which was published after the EU-India Summit on 15 July 
2020 (EU 2020).  
As indicated above, this essay will primarily address the question of the role and 
meaning of military cooperation within the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. 
 
Imprecise definition of “strategic partnership” 
 
To better understand the role and meaning of military cooperation within this partnership, it 
would be useful to take a look at the definition of such a partnership. 
 However, although “strategic partnerships” are important foreign policy instruments 
and serve as a process and format for conducting external relations with key actors, there are 
different definitions of such a partnership, and this vagueness also exists with regard to the 
“strategic partnership”2 between the EU and India (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 309; Jain 2014: 5; 
Singh 2016: 541).   
 In EU documents, the term “strategic partnership” first appears in the European 
Security Strategy 2003 where it is used as a kind of unspecific foreign policy instrument 
(Singh 2016: 541). In other official EU documents, there is no further clear definition of this 
term; however, it is sometimes associated with the implementation of FTA (Jain & Sachdeva 
2019: 311; Singh 2016: 543).  
 There is also no official definition of this term in documents of the Indian government. 
In general, in India “strategic partnerships” are apparently regarded as purely declaratory and 
politically appropriate foreign policy instruments for long-term cooperation with countries 
that pursue divergent political and economic views and orientations, but with which 
convergence in terms of common foreign policy interests is to be promoted (Jain & Sachdeva 
2019: 310). According to India, however, there are four significant elements of its “strategic 
partnership” with the EU: first, the primary objective is economic; second, the partnership 
 
2 Sean Kay defines a “strategic partnership” as a tool which „enhances or justifies a close relationship between 
two states that seek mutual gains but whose interests may be competitive rather than shared“ (Kay 2000: 15). 
strengthens ‘strategic’  autonomy; third, it is based on mutual equality, common interest and 
benefit; and fourth, it is not asymmetric, with one side being prescriptive or intrusive and the 
other passive (Jain 2014: 7ff.; Singh 2016: 544).  
 From all this, it is obvious that in the absence of a precise definition, the “strategic 
partnership” between the EU and India can be interpreted in different ways. Below it will be 
shown that pertinent Indian English, Hindi, German and French news media have completely 




In the previous section it was mentioned that from India’s perspective the primary objective 
of the EU-India “strategic partnership” is economic. The EU could certainly benefit from this, 
as India’s gross domestic product has grown by an average of 7% over the last few years and 
the country has a highly dynamic market. India’s economy, which has been growing rapidly 
for years, can be attributed primarily to strong domestic demand, which goes hand in hand 
with rising consumer spending (EC 2020).   
It is remarkable, however, that the EU was India’s most important trading partner in 
2019. Total bilateral trade amounted to EUR 100 billion at that time (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 
309ff.; Stamelos & Tsimaras 2019: 137ff.). In 2018 this figure was still EUR 92 billion. This 
corresponded to 12.9 % of India’s total trade. Bilateral trade between India and China in the 
same period was slightly lower at 10.9 %. India’s trade with the USA also amounted to 10.1% 
during the same period and was thus also weaker than EU-India trade. The EU was also 
India’s main export destination, accounting for around 18 % of India’s total exports (EC 
2020). 
However, from EU’s perspective, the situation is completely different, as India was 
only EU’s 10th trading partner in 2019. Trade in goods between the EU and India in 2019 
accounted for only 1.9 % of EU’s total trade. This puts India far behind the USA, with which 
the volume of trade amounted to 15.2 %. The volume of trade with China was 13.8 %. 
Although trade between the EU and India has increased by 72 % over the last decade (EC 
2020), India’s marginal role in EU’s trade relations is clearly visible. 
  With the aim of increasing bilateral trade and intensifying economic relations between 
the two sides, a treaty for the implementation of an FTA was negotiated between 2007 and 
2013. However, these negotiations proved to be extremely tough, which is why negotiations 
were declared frozen in 2013. Admittedly, as the EC and India signalled interest in continuing 
the negotiations (EC 2020; Felbermayr et al. 2016: 10), negotiations were resumed in 2018 
(Khorana 2019).  
These tough negotiations on the implementation of the EU-India FTA, which have 
been going on for years, can be seen as evidence of the failure of a common understanding 
between the EU and India. The above-mentioned vague definition of the “strategic 
partnership” between the EU and India can certainly also be seen as further evidence of a lack 
of common understanding. It seems reasonable to include the importance of language and 




Language and perception  
 
Above it has been expressed that there is a clear lack of common understanding between the 
EU and India in many respects. It is worth repeating that a common understanding and “one 
common language” between the EU and India is based on a wide range of both EU and Indian 
languages. English and Hindi are two important languages in this respect, firstly because they 
are both official languages of the Indian Union according to § 343 of the Indian Constitution, 
and secondly because these languages cover a large part of the population of India. 
Furthermore, English is the language of economic policy actors. 
However, the diplomatic and English communication seems to be conflict-ridden, 
which is apparently also reflected in the so far failed negotiations on the implementation of 
the EU-India FTA. In fact, however, there are also concrete indications that there are clear 
grievances at the level of English communication between politicians and decision-makers of 
EU and India, as condescending and patronising attitudes emerge in communication (Grant 
2008: 1; Wülbers 2011: 21). Of course, such communication can neither promote an FTA nor 
any other joint project between the EU and India.  
However, not only communication between politicians and economic policy makers 
should be taken into account, but also communication within the civil society, as this 
communication significantly shapes public opinion. At the latest since the publication of 
Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion3, comprehensive literature that deals with the 
interrelationships between public opinion, which is largely shaped by the media, and 
economic policy, is available.4 
Despite the large number of theories and findings, it is undisputed that media – among 
other factors – have a decisive influence on perception and economic policy decisions.  
Furthermore, above mentioned literature proves that interdependencies between political 
reality and “media reality” can never be considered separately, as they are in a permanent and 
mutual process. These findings are thus also directly related to the “strategic partnership” and 
the so far not implemented FTA between the EU and India.  
 
Hindi discourses  
 
However, while it is widely taken for granted within the research community that English 
based discourses are considered in such contexts, it is surprising that other Indian languages 
are not given the same attention. This may be due to the assumption that these languages pay 
little or no attention to such discourses and/or that their focus on specific indigenous target 
groups only have minimal influence on politics and economy. It seems appropriate to explain 
the role and meaning of the Hindi language in this context. 
First of all, it should be noted that Hindi media almost reach 40% of the population of 
India. With this percentage rate the Hindi media clearly have the highest reach among media 
in native languages (Neyazi 2018: 1). The reach of Hindi media is mainly increased by the 
leading daily newspapers Dainik Bhāskar and Dainik JāgꞋraṇ, which today publish their 
 
3 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922. 
4 Luhmann 1996; Chomsky & Edward S. Herman 2002 and Erbring 1989 are just a few of the many pertinent 
publications.  
 
papers in twelve (Dainik Bhāskar) and eleven (Dainik JāgꞋraṇ) Union states of India. The 
number of Union states where Hindi is the predominant language is eight (ibid. 8). This 
shows the important role that leading Hindi newspapers play in conveying information. It 
should also be mentioned that Dainik Bhāskar and Dainik JāgꞋraṇ seem to partially support 
the political agenda of the current BJP government. The political relevance of Hindi media 
can also be seen in the fact that politicians today give exclusive interviews to the Hindi press 
(ibid. 108f.). 
Under the current BJP government, which received its votes primarily from the 
economically significant Indian middle class, Hindi even has gained greater importance. 
Despite criticism, the BJP has tried to establish Hindi as the only national language (Neyazi 
2018: 8; Fernandes 2015: 239). Moreover, the BJP’s election victories go hand in hand with a 
political upheaval in which the leading anglicised Indian strata clearly have lost political 
control. Population groups that are more inclined to native languages and thus to thoughts and 
ideas conveyed in these languages are increasingly exerting political influence.  
  It therefore seems reasonable to also consider the attitude of India’s Hindi-speaking 
population about the EU, the EU-India “strategic partnership” and the so far failed 
negotiations on the EU-India FTA. Before providing a glimpse into this attitude, it is worth 
taking a closer look at the Indian media landscape. 
In comparison to English newspapers, which mainly focus on urban areas and big 
cities, Hindi newspapers have a stronger presence in small towns and rural areas (Neyazi 
2018: 15; Schneider 2014). Already in 1981, the proportion of English newspapers in small 
towns and rural areas only was 5.3%, while the proportion of Hindi newspapers was 32.7%. 
However, Hindi dailies managed to expand their presence in the capitals of India’s individual 
Union states, which are crucial for political activities. In 1981, the proportion of Hindi 
newspapers in these capitals was 13.4%, the proportion of English newspapers 14.1%. By 
2016, however, the proportion of Hindi newspapers in this important segment had exceeded 
that of English newspapers. By 2016, the share of Hindi newspapers in the capitals of the 
Union states had risen to 24.5%. At the same time, the share of English newspapers only 
reached 19% in this segment. In fact, already in 2015, Hindi dailies accounted for the lion’s 
share, with a circulation of almost 141 million copies and 47.7% of the total circulation of 
Indian daily newspapers. At that time English dailies ranked second with 33 million copies 
and 11.4% of total circulation (Neyazi 2018: 64f.).  
  Paradoxically, it is unmistakable that use of the internet is growing faster in rural India 
than in cities. Above all, this is facilitated by the fact that content is transmitted in regional 
languages, not in English. In fact, as early as 2014, Google called for the establishment of the 
Indian Language Internet Alliance, which promotes Indian languages on the Internet. 
Between 2014 and 2015 Hindi websites grew by 97%, while English websites only grew by 
19% at the same time. Although the number of Internet users in all Indian languages is 
growing rapidly, the increase on Hindi speaking Internet users is more pronounced. By 2016, 
the growth of Internet users in local languages had already reached 127 million, exceeding the 
number of Internet users in English. Almost half of these 127 million users used the Internet 
in Hindi (Neyazi 2018: 192). Given the significant growth of Hindi media over the last two 
decades, their influence on politics, especially in the Union states, cannot be denied (Neyazi 
2018: 192).  
India’s perception of the EU-India Free trade agreement  
In view of the unexhausted EU-India relations, the so far failed negotiations on the EU-India 
FTA and the hardly noticeable cooperation within the EU-India “strategic partnership”, it 
seems reasonable to take a look at what is perceived in India in this respect. Hindi media 
should not be ignored in this context. 
 First of all, the long-lasting negotiations of the EU-India FTA suggest that media 
reporting about the status of negotiations is not only positive. In 2011, the opinion-leading 
Hindi daily Amar Ujālā published the article Vikasit deśoṃ ke cor darꞋvāje, which can be 
translated into “(t)he postern gates of the developed countries”. The article criticises the 
industrialised countries and the negotiations on world trade (Doha Round). The Doha Round 
is not only incapable, but also not interested in solving problems in developing and emerging 
countries. The industrialised countries would only continue the negotiations on the EU-India 
FTA in order to increase their own prosperity and their share in world trade. To this end, they 
would enter into secret negotiations and would try to implement FTAs that go beyond the 
standards of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Amar Ujālā 2011). 
The article UlꞋṭe rāste par calꞋne kī jid, which can be translated as “(t)he obstinacy of 
walking along contrary paths”, was published in 2012 in the opinion-leading daily Hindustān 
Dainik and is a commentary by Sitaram Yechury, the leader of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist). In the very second sentence, Yechury states that the EU is in a serious economic 
crisis and that the existence of the Euro is threatened. Especially because of the stagnating 
economic situation in the EU, the EU has demanded access to the Indian market (Hindustān 
Dainik 2012). 
Both articles expressed an extremely negative perception of the EU and the EU-India 
FTA, which as mentioned above is linked to the EU-India “strategic partnership”. The fact 
that media coverage always has influence on economic policy decisions, and in particular that 
Hindi media has a major influence on Indian politics, underlines the importance of these two 
articles. These two articles have certainly provided a leading impetus and contributed to the 
fact that the EU-India FTA negotiations are still not concluded. It stands to reason that Indian 
negotiators involved in the negotiations must take account of these criticisms of the EU and 
the EU-India FTA, which are widespread among the Indian population.  
India’s perception of military cooperation   
With regard to military cooperation within the “strategic partnership” between the EU and 
India, it is also worth taking a look at the perception of this partnership. Although this essay is 
essentially limited to India’s perspective, European media naturally also report on the EU-
India FTA and the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. With regard to military 
cooperation within the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India, however, there are 
indications that this cooperation has a much higher relevance for India than for the EU.  
  At least the German business and financial newspaper Handelsblatt and the French 
financial newspaper Les Échos considered the “strategic partnership” between the EU and 
India and ‚strategic‘ influence in association with the EU-India FTA and access to the Indian 
market for European companies (Handelsblatt 2007; Les Échos 2013). Within these articles 
the focus was on economic aspects, not on military ones.  
 Pertinent Indian media also give the impression that the economic policy 
understanding of this partnership is important. However, there are also clear indications that 
the association of this partnership is much more strongly associated with military aspects and, 
in fact, even forcefully needs to be associated by military aspects.  
 The opinion-leading Hindi daily NavꞋbhārat Ṭāims (NT) already addressed this 
“strategic partnership” in the context of the EU-India FTA in 2007. In three different articles, 
the paper suggested that the conclusion of this FTA would help to strengthen this “strategic 
partnership”. It is noteworthy that the term ‘strategic’ was basically used as sāmꞋrik, because 
this word actually means “military”5. Paradoxically, however, the three articles primarily 
referred to cooperation in the fields of business, science and energy (NT 2007a.; b; c.).  
 The Hindi news portal IBN76 also addressed this “strategic partnership” and reported 
in 2010 that former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to Brussels for the EU-India 
summit (IBN7: 2010). In addition to talks on economic cooperation, talks on the fight against 
terrorism and a reform of the UN Security Council had been scheduled. Singh described a 
change in the partnership between India and the EU, in particular highlighting the mutual 
understanding between the two sides: 
pradhānꞋmaṃtrī ne kahā, “yūropīya saṃgh ke sāth hamārī bhāgīdārī ārthik aur vikās meṃ sahꞋyog 
se śurū hokar vyāpak raṇꞋnītik sampark meṃ badlī hai. unhoṃne kahā ki bhārat yūropīya saṃgh 
kī bṛhat7 bhūmikā kā svāgat karꞋtā hai.” unhoṃne kahā ki bhārat aur yūropīya saṃgh ke bīc 
lokꞋtaṃtra, bahulꞋvād, sahiṣṇutā, kānūn kā śāsan, mūlꞋbhūt8 mānavādhikāroṃ, pres kī svataṃtratā 
aur nyāyālay kī svataṃtratā ke lie sammān jaise mūlya ekꞋsamān haiṃ. unhoṃne kahā ki vaiśvik 
masꞋloṃ par hamāre vicāroṃ meṃ kāphī samānꞋtā hai. unhoṃne kahā ki vah ātaṃkꞋvād aur 
surakṣā kī gair-paramparāgat cunautiyoṃ se nipaṭꞋne sahit rājꞋnītik9 evaṃ raṇꞋnītik sahꞋyog 
baṙhāne ke lie prayās kareṃge. (IBN7: 2010)  
The Prime Minister said: “Our partnership with the European Union has evolved from economic 
[cooperation] and development cooperation to a comprehensive strategic (literally: military) 
relationship. He said that India welcomes the European Union’s demonstrative role.” He said 
that within India and the European Union, values such as respect for democracy, pluralism, 
tolerance, the rule of law, fundamental human rights, freedom of the press and independence of 
the judiciary are identical. He said that there is considerable agreement in our (i.e. India and the 
EU) views on global issues. He said that he will make efforts to develop political and strategic 
(literally: military) cooperation along with addressing the unconventional challenges of 
terrorism and security. 
 
It is remarkable that this “strategic partnership” was discussed here in the close context 
of security and terrorism by using the term raṇꞋnītik, actually “military skillful” or “military 
strategic”10 (IBN7: 2010). Although this term is different from the above-mentioned sāmꞋrik 
“military”, which was used in 2007 by NavꞋbhārat Ṭāims, it also leads to an exclusively 
military interpretation of this “strategic partnership”. 
 
5 More literal “related to war/conflict“. 
6 Since 2016 this TV-canal is called News18 India. 
7 Published vṛhat. 
8 Published mūlꞋbhat. 
9 Published rāj'nīti. 
10 More literal “related to the science of war”. 
  This Hindi-language or lexical occurrence is not without its problems. Even if this is 
an attempt to adapt to the non-military semantics of the English ‘strategic’, the newly created, 
transferred meaning of the Hindi word is most likely still foreign to most Hindi speakers. This 
means that the military character is always in the foreground of understanding this “strategic 
partnership”. In a nutshell and translated, this even means that the “strategic partnership” 
between the EU and India is a „military partnership“ for Hindi speakers. This is certainly 
something different from what the EU intended.      
  This fact should also be seen in the context of Indian English news media. In 2010, 
Hindustan Times (HTi) reported on this “strategic partnership” and published the article 
“Poland keen to supply tank recovery vehicles to India” (HTi 2010a.). Although there is no 
official “strategic partnership” between Poland and India till date (Kugiel 2019: 143ff.), the 
article focused on the EU-India FTA and military and economic cooperation between India 
and Poland. Here, the term ‘strategic’ was also given a geographical meaning, which in the 
broadest sense referred to the geographical area of Europe. However, it would have been 
more precise and direct to simply speak of the economic area of Europe, because strictly 
speaking, in this overall military context, the economic aspects were in the foreground at this 
point. It is obvious that themes related to the term ‘strategic’ smoothly merge with each other 
and that there is no clear understanding of the term. 
Even though the term ‘strategic’ or “strategic partnership” was not used in another 
article from HTi, the desire for a more intensive economic relationship with the EU, the 
conclusion of the EU-India FTA, a joint fight against terrorism, and a reform of the UN 
Security Council were reflected in this article. Here it was emphasised that above all Germany 
is a relevant supplier of military goods for India (HTi 2010b.). This is in so far interesting 
because a “strategic partnership” between Germany and India already exists since 2000 (Jain 
2014: 8; Singh 2016: 544).11 In an article of CNN-IBN published in 2013, Germany was also 
described as India’s ‘strategic’ partner (CNN-IBN 2013). It can be seen that India has an 
expectation regarding the supply of military equipment to Germany, which is also 
contextually related to the “strategic partnership” between the EU/Germany and India and the 
implementation of the EU-India FTA.  
However, the range of meanings of the term ‘strategic’ or “strategic partnership” is not 
yet exhausted with these examples. In another article from HTi, the “strategic partnership” 
between the EU and India was enthusiastically and hopefully described by Manmohan Singh. 
Singh also linked this partnership to issues of the economy, counter-terrorism and energy. The 
ambiguity about exactly which areas this partnership covers is reinforced here, by the fact that 
the sectors “development”, “education” and “science” are also included. However, the 
military component was at least hinted by terms such as “peace”, “stability” and “security”. 
Here, too, it is clearly visible how topics related to the term ‘strategic’ merge with each other.  
He said [Manmohan Singh] India’s partnership with the EU was poised for further expansion, 
and ‘we will work with the EU towards world peace, stability and prosperity’. ‘We see EU as a 
key strategic partner in meeting India’s development needs.’ Over the years, the partnership 
between India and the European Union has matured tremendously, covering areas like politics, 
security, education and science. (HTi 2010c.) 
 
11 Already in 1998 France and India concluded a „strategic partnership“ (Jain 2014:8; Singh 2016: 544). 
Conclusion 
Language, perception and media coverage have a strong influence on the conclusion of the 
EU-India FTA and the EU-India “strategic partnership”. In India the Hindi-speaking civil 
society and Hindi media play an important role in this context, as they have a major influence 
on Indian politics.  
  It has been expressed that the EU and the conclusion of the EU-India FTA are also 
negatively perceived by Hindi media. It was also pointed out that the EU and India have not 
yet succeeded in defining their “strategic partnership” in terms of concepts and contents. At 
the same time, European and Indian news media have different expectations of this 
partnership. India’s high claims and hopes regarding this “strategic partnership” are clearly 
reflected in above quotes by Manmohan Singh. In concrete terms, it has become visible that 
the meaning of the term ‘strategic’ and the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India 
varies greatly depending on the country, situation and context. The economic component of 
this partnership is of high importance to EU and India.  
  However, the Indian perception of this partnership in relation to military cooperation 
must be addressed. This aspect seems to be of great importance to India. Of course, there are 
historical and political reasons for putting military cooperation high on the agenda. But it 
needs to be highlighted that there might be a different view in the EU.  
  First of all Hindi-speaker speak of a “military partnership” when referring to the 
“strategic partnership” between the EU and India. This close military association, which goes 
hand in hand with more intensive military cooperation, a lack of the definition of this 
partnership, and a negative image of the EU in India, at least leaves room for interpretation; 
perhaps even explosive political power. The question must be asked whether and how this 
state of affairs can have an impact in the context of current conflicts between India and 
Pakistan and India and China, for example. Is it not inevitably very obvious that a large part 
of Indian civil society, due to the “military partnership” between the EU and India, is also 
fundamentally asking itself the question of stronger military support by the EU? And to what 
extent can the EU actually meet such high expectations of the “strategic partnership”?   
  Strong military expectations of the EU, such as those expressed above in the quotes by 
Manmohan Singh, but which are not reciprocated by the EU, could further worsen EU’s 
image in India and thus the EU-India relationship. This threat also exists for German-Indian 
relations. The “strategic partnership” between Germany (and the EU) and India, Germany’s  
role in the EU, and India’s direct military expectations of Germany, as discussed above, are 
good reasons to question Indo-German relations as well.  
  Ultimately, the lack of a definition of the “strategic partnership” between the EU and 
India causes irritation for the EU, Germany and India. Indeed, a definition is overdue. A 
definition of this partnership may involve high diplomatic efforts, but it can provide a 
‘strategic’ momentum for intensifying relations. On the other hand, the continued neglect of a 
definition could have an unpredictable explosive political power.  
  This, and the new Sino-Indian relationship, would be an opportunity for the EU to 
rethink its relations with India and Europe’s knowledge of India. For if India were to favour 
China over the so-called “West”, the authoritarian Chinese model could further encourage 
similar tendencies in India – certainly not in the interest of this “West”. A stronger “strategic 
partnership” and the implementation of the EU-India FTA could certainly serve as signs of 
confidence and preludes to meaningful and understanding-based relations. 
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